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PREPARED FOR THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
CONCEPTS:  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION BY MELVIN RICHTER AT THE 1998 ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, BOSTON, MA, SEPTEMBER 
3,1998. 
  
HOW HISTORICAL IS BEGRIFFGESCHICHTE? 
Begriffsgeschichte and the History of Political  Discourses 
On several occasions Melvin Richter has sought to open a dialogue between the 
history of political “languages” and “discourses” that has been attempted, over the last 
several decades, in the writings of John Pocock and Quentin Skinner and the 
Begriffsgeschichte practiced by Reinhart Koselleck and others, most notably in the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, the “historical lexicon” of German “political-social 
discourse” edited Koselleck in collaboration with Otto Brunner and Werner Conze.1  It 
has not been an easy discussion to sustain. Pocock, who does not read German, knows of 
the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe only from Richter’s summaries, while Skinner has 
remained “unrepentant” in the belief that “there can be no histories of concepts; there can 
only be histories of their uses in argument.”2  Pocock allows that it is “a genuinely 
interesting possibility that there might come to exist a historical lexicon of principal 
terms and concepts … in the fields of discourse that I study, in which the history of each 
separate item was severally set forth and made available for my instruction.”3  But he 
goes on to raise the difficult questions of to which history the terms collected in the such 
a lexicon are “basic” and what morphology of “life-forms” is being brought to light when 
                                                
1 See Melvin Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 124-42 and Richter, “Reconstructing the History of 
Political Languages: Pocock, Skinner, and the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,” History and Theory 
XIX (1990):38-70. 
2 John Pocock, “Concepts and Discourses: A Difference in Culture? Comment on a Paper by Melvin 
Richter” in Hartmut Lehmann and Melvin Richter, eds., The Meaning of Historical Terms and 
Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte,”  (Occasional Paper No. 15, German Historical 
Institute, Washington, DC, 1996) 47. Quentin Skinner, “Reply to My Critics” in James Tully, ed., 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) 
283. 
3 Pocock, “Concepts and Discourses” 50 
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one traces the history of these concepts.4  Skinner has been even more resistant. 
Following Wittgenstein, he insists that there can be no understanding of a concept 
without a comprehension of the “range of things that can be done with it.”5  For this 
reason, he emphatically rejects “that type of history which assumes that we can treat the 
morphology of concepts in isolation from questions about agency and explanation.”6 
In response Richter has maintained that the approach of the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe is not a history of ideas of the sort that Skinner and Pocock have rejected. 
Koselleck, he argues, has “deplored the absence of context in previous German histories 
of ideas” and has “insisted on identifying changes in language with human agents.”7  Yet, 
while this may well have been Koselleck’s intention, it is not at all clear that the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe fulfills this intention to a degree that would overcome the 
reservations of Pocock and Skinner. Indeed, the ambitious claims Koselleck makes about 
the general rules of development of concepts during the period between 1750-1850 
suggest that the accommodation Richter is attempting to work out may be plagued by 
considerable difficulties. Koselleck argues that political and social concepts during this 
period (which he has dubbed the “Sattelzeit”) exhibit four general tendencies: (1) 
“temporization” [Verzeitlichung] — the insertion of concepts into teleological 
philosophies of history, (2) “democratization” [Demokratisierung] — the extension of 
specialized political and social vocabularies to a mass audience, (3) “ideologization” 
[Ideologiesierbarkeit] — the generalization of particular concepts and ideas into 
universal, organizing ideologies, (4) “politicization” [Politisierung] — the incorporation 
                                                
4 Pocock, “Concepts and Discourses” 52, 54. 
5 Skinner, “Reply to My Critics,” 283 
6 Letter to Melvin Richter, cited in Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 135 
7 Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 135. 
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of concepts into “propaganda slogans and terms of abuse.”8  To the extent that 
Begriffsgeschichte is directed towards tracing the ways in which concepts develop 
according to rules that are independent of the intentions of specific agents, Pocock’s 
question of “which history” is being traced and “what morphology of life forms” is being 
illuminated takes on a new force. If the ultimate goal of Begriffsgeschichte is the testing 
of hypotheses about the general development of concepts across the period from 1750-
1850, then it is hard to see how this undertaking is historical at all. We would appear to 
have left behind a study of particular languages, agents, and events for a set of 
generalizations about conceptual development that work behind the backs of historical 
agents.  
To clarify the problem that Pocock and Skinner may be having with a 
Begriffsgeschichte of this sort, we would do well to consider the question of what 
actually happens  in a Begriffsgeschichte. In what follows will distinguish between three 
different types of conceptual changes that Richter mentions in the course of his 
explanation of the sorts of things that Begriffsgeschichte  does. I will suggest that while 
two of these sorts of changes would qualify as historical for Pocock and Skinner, the third 
does not. I will further argue that, at least on the basis of my own experience with the 
lexicon, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe tends to provide accounts of conceptual change 
that, for the most part, fall into this third category. 
How Concepts Change 
Richter’s book provides us with a number of examples of the ways in which 
concepts change over time. At the risk of some schematization, we can group them into 
three different categories. First of all, concepts sometimes become explicit objects of 
discussion and debate. Richter provides an example of this sort of change in his 
                                                
8 Koselleck, “Einleitung” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Stuttgart: Klett, 1972) Vol. 1, xvi-xviii. See 
the discussion in Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 37-8 
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discussion of Roger Chartier’s entry on “civilité” in the Handbuch politisch-sozialer 
Grundbegriffe in France, 1680-1820, crucial parts of which involve explicit attempts to 
answer the question “what is civilité.”9  Other examples could be found in the extended 
debate over the question “What is enlightenment?” in German periodicals and pamphlets 
between 1784 and 1795,10 or the discussion during the French Revolution of the famous 
question of the Abbe Siéyes, “What is the Third Estate?” In cases such as these (and it 
bears emphasizing that we should not overestimate the number of such cases that we can 
find) concepts have become expressly thematized by agents. It is they, not we, who ask 
the question “What is enlightenment?” or “What is civilité.” Among the things that these 
agents are doing is trying to get clear on how certain concepts should properly be used. 
Any conceptual change that results from discussions such as these would seem to be 
unproblematically “historical” even under the strictest requirements of Pocock and 
Skinner. For here what is happening is that agents are explicitly reflecting on their 
concepts and recommending alterations.  In this case, perhaps uniquely, conceptual 
changes is something that agents do. 
Richter notes a second way that conceptual change occurs: individual political 
and social theorists “have sought to alter thought and practice by coining or radically 
redefining concepts, or redescribing practices.”11  This is the sort of conceptual change 
that is most often invoked by theorists of political thought. As an example we can take 
Hegel’s altered use of the term bürgerliche Gesellschaft in his Rechtsphilosophie. Where 
earlier thinkers (and, indeed, Hegel himself in his earlier works) had used the term as a 
synonym for “political society” or “state,” in the Rechtsphilosophie Hegel sharply 
                                                
9 Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 99-123, esp. 105-7. 
10 On this debate, see my collection What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and 
Twentieth-Century Questions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996). 
11 Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 153. 
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distinguishes state and civil society, much to the confusion of some of his first 
reviewers.12  While this second case closely resembles the first in that we have an 
identifiable agent explicitly redefining concepts or redescribing practices, there is still a 
crucial difference. Hegel’s transformation of “bürgerliche Gesellschaft “ does not occur 
in the course of an ongoing discussion of the question “What is bürgerliche Gesellschaft 
?” He is not, like Kant in his contribution to the discussion of the question “What is 
Enlightenment?”, joining others in the discussion of a concept that has come under 
scrutiny. For this reason, the question of what Hegel is doing when he starts to use 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft  in a different way than his predecessors is a bit more difficult 
than the question of what Kant is doing in responding to the question “What is 
Enlightenment?”  Kant is, unproblematically, making a contribution to an ongoing 
discussion (indeed, he even informs us of what parts of the discussion he has missed: his 
essay closes with a footnote that indicates that he was not able to get a copy of Moses 
Mendelssohn’s response to the same question). It is not immediately clear, however, what 
discussion Hegel is joining and the term “bürgerliche Gesellschaft “ would appear to 
have been in good working order prior to his proposed definition. This makes the change 
that he brings about in the use of the concept all the more obscure. Why does it happen? 
Why was his proposed redefinition so compelling to subsequent thinkers? Indeed, can we 
speak of this as a “redefinition” at all, since Hegel takes no notice of how the term had 
been used before him and gives no indication that he is aware that he is using the term in 
a different way?  In attempting to understand what is happening when thinkers like Hegel 
begin using old terms in new ways our focus shifts from the history of the term “civil 
society” — which may not necessarily provide clues as to why Hegel is doing what he 
                                                
12 See Manfred Riedel’s discussion in his entry “Gesellschaft, bürgerliche” in Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe II.  For my own sense of what Hegel was doing, see “Paideia for the ‘Bürger als 
Bourgeois ’: The Concept of ‘Civil Society’ in Hegel’s Political Thought”, History of Political 
Thought , II:3 (1982) 469-493.  
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does — to consider the development of Hegel’s views on politics and society. In 
attempting to understand why Hegel’s innovation had such an impact on subsequent 
thinkers (after all, many other innovations may have no impact at all), we need to trace 
out the history of the reception of the Rechtsphilosophie.  This sort of history, once again, 
is not that far from what Pocock and Skinner would view as the proper task for historians 
of political thought. At first glance, it would also seem to be the sort of history of 
concepts that is offered in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. On closer examination, 
however, the latter is often not the case. 
What we typically encounter in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe  instead is a 
third sort of conceptual change in which a concept changes its meaning, perhaps subject 
to Koselleck’s hypotheses regarding temporization, democratization, ideologization, and 
politicization or perhaps because of the broader set of transformations associated with the 
Sattelzeit. The progressive redefinition of the concept may be documented by looking at 
the usage of the concept in the writings of various thinkers, but the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe also makes use of such sources as contemporary dictionaries and 
encyclopedias, suggesting that it is concerned not so much with what individuals are 
doing to a concept but rather with what a concept is doing, behind the backs or above the 
heads of individual agents. The use of contemporary dictionaries and encyclopedias as 
evidence for this process bears particular notice here. Richter has suggested that the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe is notable for its inclusion of evidence from such sources, 
implying that the addition of such materials is an important supplement to the sources 
typically used by Pocock and Skinner.13 But such sources would have only a limited 
utility for Pocock and Skinner, since sources such as these can give us little in the way of 
insight into the uses to which these concepts have been put in actual arguments — and 
                                                
13 Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 139. 
What Happens in Begriffgeschichte? 7 
the history of the uses of concepts in argument is, for Skinner, the only real history that 
concepts can have. 
What Happens in  Begriffsgeschichte? 
Most of the entries in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe with which I am familiar 
(and let me immediately confess that there is a good deal of it that I have not read) 
provide accounts of conceptual change of this last sort. Examples are provided from a 
diversity of sources to show how the meaning of a concept changed over the period 
between 1750 and 1850. In some of these accounts, special emphasis is place on 
particular thinkers who were instrumental in altering the way in which concepts were 
deployed. On occasion, the thinkers cited will have been engaged in debates with other 
thinkers over the use of the term, but the authors of articles in the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe sometimes do not seem to find such debates of much importance. Thus, 
Horst Stuke’s ninety-nine page entry on “Aufklärung” provides a typology of “typical” 
formulations of the concept in the last third of the eighteenth century, but curiously offers 
no account of the origin of the public debate over the concept in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift or of the private discussion of the concept within the Berlin Wednesday 
Society, a secret society of “Friends of Enlightenment” linked to the journal. Both 
discussions provide us with remarkable cases of particular thinkers reflecting on a 
concept and seeking to define what it means in the face of a host of political and social 
challenges. But none of this makes it into Stuke’s survey. Nor is his discussion 
particularly concerned with the impact of the shifting political fortunes of enlightened 
reformers in Prussia on attempts to define what enlightenment is.  Andreas Riem’s 
impassioned pamphlet Über Aufklärung, perhaps the most widely read of the pamphlets 
published in response to Frederick William II’s attack on the enlightened approaches to 
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Christian doctrine embraced by the leading figures within the Berlin clergy,14 is given 
cursory treatment and described as providing an “undifferentiated, global unified concept 
of philosophy, natural science, intellectual power, and rational life-conduct.”15 It would 
be difficult to think of a way of characterizing Riem’s essay that had less to say about its 
historical importance. Certainly Frederick William himself understood the import of the 
pamphlet somewhat differently. Once it became known that Riem was its author, he was 
forced to spend the rest of his life in exile. 
This is not, of course, to say that there are not things to be learned from Stuke’s 
article or from the other entries in the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Despite the rather 
Olympian distance they keep from the scruffier history of arguments and counter-
arguments that makes up the history of political thought, the entries in the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe  remain helpful starting points for making sense of how terms are being 
used. But it is difficult to see how they provide a “history” in any immediately 
recognizable sense.  Suggesting that there is “much in both the metatheories and practices 
of Pocock and Skinner that should be applied to the analyses” of the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe and the Handbuch, Richter argues 
Pocock’s identification of political languages used in early modern 
and eighteenth-century Britain is a particularly valuable technique 
of analysis and comparison. With it as a model, the data in the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe could serve as a base for mapping 
the principal political and social languages used in German-
speaking Europe. … Thus the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’s 
                                                
14 For discussions of Riem’s essay see Werner Schneiders, Die wahre Aufklärung (Munich: Karl Alber, 
1974) 95-100, Fritz Valjavec, “Das Woellnersche Religionsedikt und seine geschichtliche 
Bedeutung,” Historisches Jahrbuch 72 (1953) 395-396, and Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of German 
Conservatism (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1966) 116-117. 
15 Horst Stuke, “Aufklärung,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 1:275. 
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findings could be reanalyzed synchronically in terms of the 
political languages employed during the Sattelzeit at intervals 
selected in terms of their significance in German history.16 
Likewise, Richter suggests that Skinner’s view of political thought as a form of 
“linguistic action” could be helpful for the “reanalysis” of the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe.17 
It may be misleading to speak here of a “reanalysis” of “data.” That would imply 
that the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe offered historians of political thought a massive 
data-set of the sorts that our colleagues who study voting behavior employ. We need only 
think about the analogy for a moment to realize why it miscarries. In “reanalyzing” a 
data-set, our colleagues in the area of voting behavior are freed from the labor of 
collecting data. They can call into question the use that other scholars have made of a 
particular data-set without having to redo the work of assembling it. I doubt that it makes 
much sense to think of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe in this way. Impressive through 
the labors of Koselleck and his colleagues may have been, they have not freed us from 
the chore of having to read again the texts that they read and to try to reconstruct the local 
contexts that they have all too often overlooked. The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe will 
remain for a long time a helpful starting point for those seeking to trace the complex 
interplay between agents, contexts, and languages that makes up the history of political 
concepts. But its articles should not be mistaken for examples of such a history. 
 
James Schmidt, Boston University 
 
                                                
16 Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts 139. 
17 Ibid. 140. 
